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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gary Lee Hartwig appeals from an order by the district court reinstating his 
requirement to register as a sexual offender pursuant to I.C. § 18-8301, et seq. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 1991, Gary Lee Hartwig ("Hartwig') was charged in Owyhee County 
with one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child under the age of 
sixteen (161, which specified that the child was eight years of age. (R., pp.10-
11.) Hartwig entered a plea of guilty to that charge (R., pp.12-14) and received a 
suspended unified sentence of ten years with five years fixed, and was placed on 
probation for ten years (R., pp.18-20). In 1998, on motion of Hartwig's counsel, 
Hartwig's probation was terminated and his case was dismissed with prejudice. 
(R., pp.37-43.) 
In 2006, Hartwig, through counsel, filed a Petition for Expungement and 
Exemption from Registration Requirements under the ten-year release provision 
of the IQaho "Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-To-
Know Act" (hereinafter referred to as "SORA"), I.C. § 18-8310(1 ).1 (R., pp.44-46, 
1 I.C. § 18-8310(1) was amended in 2001 (2001 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.194, §3, 
p.661) and reads in relevant part (with 2001 amended language underscored): 
RELEASE FROM REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
EXPUNGEMENT. (1) Any person, other than a recidivist, an 
offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or an 
offender designated as a violent sexuat predator, may, after a 
period of ten (10) years from the date the person was released from 
incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, 
whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause 
1 
51-61.) After a hearing held on March 9, 2007, in which three witnesses testified 
(including the now adult victim), the district court denied Hartwig's petition for 
expungement and exemption from SORA's registration requirements. (R., pp.63-
65.) On February 1, 2008, Hartwig's counsel filed a Petition to Set Aside Plea, 
Dismiss Case, and Exemption from Registration Requirements, seeking a 
hearing to show Hartwig was "not at risk to commit a new violation for any violent 
crime or crimes identified in § 18-8304 of the Idaho Code, and thereby being 
exempt from the reporting requirements in the future .... " (R., pp.66-68.) 
Hartwig filed his own affidavit in support of the motion, and appended to his 
affidavit a psychological evaluation prepared by Dwight D. Mowry, Ph.D. in 2007. 
(R., pp.69-79.) 
After a second hearing was held, wherein both the victim (now an adult) 
and Dr. Mowry testified on Hartwig's behalf, the district court granted Hartwig's 
petition to be released from the sex offender registration requirements pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-8310. (R., pp.80-83; Tr. Vol.1, pp.5-53.) However, a little more than 
a month later, the state filed a motion to reconsider, pointing out that Hartwig 
was, in any event, ineligible to petition for release from SORA's registration 
requirements because I.C. §§ 18-8303(1)2 and 18-8310(1), as amended in 2001, 
defined Hartwig's criminal offense as an "aggravated offense" because the victim 
hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted from 
the duty to register as a sexual offender. 
2 In 2001, I.C. § 18-8303(1) was entirely amended by making it a definition 
section for "[a]ggravated offense," which included "Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd 
conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age); .... " 2001 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, ch.194, §1, p.659. 
2 
was under the age of twelve at the time of the offense. (R., pp.85-86.) After 
Hartwig filed an objection to the state's motion for reconsideration (R., pp.87-92), 
a hearing was held at which the district court tentatively stated that it would be 
reversing its prior ruling, but requested written briefs on the matter (R., pp.94-95). 
Both parties submitted briefing on the question of whether Hartwig was 
eligible to petition for release from SORA's registration requirements, with 
Hartwig's counsel challenging the constitutionality (state and federal) of SORA, 
and its amendments, on ex post facto, due process, and Contracts Clause 
grounds. (R., pp.96-120.) On March 13,2009, the parties argued their relative 
positions at a hearing, and the district court ruled that under the current status of 
the law, it was required to grant the state's motion, and it subsequently issued an 
order reinstating Hartwig's requirement to register as a sexual offender. (R., 
pp.152-156.) Hartwig filed a timely appeal from that order. (R., pp.157-164.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Hartwig states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual 
Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001 and subsequently, 
violates Idaho laws prohibiting retroactive laws? 
2. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual 
Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001 and subsequently, 
violates the ex post facto provisions of the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
3. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual 
Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001 and subsequently, 
with criminal penalties for non-compliance violates the ex post facto 
provision of the U.S. Constitution. 
4. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual 
Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001 and subsequently, 
violates the Due Process Clauses of the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
5. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual 
Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001 and subsequently, 
violates the Contracts Clauses of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.B.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Does Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Act, as amended in 2001, violate the 
Idaho or United States Constitutions? ~<" 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Act, As Amended In 2001. Does Not 
Violate The Idaho Or United States Constitutions 
A. Introduction 
Hartwig claims application to his case of the 2001 and subsequent 
amendments to Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Act are unconstitutional 
because they violate: (1) retroactivity laws, (2) ex post facto provisioris, (3) due 
process rights, and (4) Contracts Clause rights. (Appellant's Brief, p.9 et seq.) 
Hartwig specifically contends application of the 2001 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-
8303(1) and 18-8310(1) is unconstitutional because they classified3 "lewd 
conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age" as an "aggravated 
offense," precluding him from petitioning for release from the sexual offender 
registration requirements. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1 0-11.) 
Contrary to Hartwig's claims, because SORA, as amended in 2001,4 is not 
punitive, its application does not violate ex post facto provisions of the state or 
federal constitutions. Further, Hartwig's claim that SORA violates his due 
process and Contracts Clause rights is unfounded. 
3 I.C. § 18-8303(1) was amended in 2009, excising the phrase, "when the victim 
is less than twelve (12) years of age," and leaving "lewd conduct" intact without 
further delineation. 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 250, p.761. 
4 Unless otherwise specified, all references to SORA include its amendments up 
to the date Hartwig petitioned for release from its registration requirements on 
June 30, 2006. (R., pp.44-46.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 
2003). A claim that a defendant's due process rights were violated is a question 
of law, subject to free review. State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643,649,977 P.2d 905, 
911 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. Because SORA Is Not Punitive, Its Application To Hartwig's Case Does 
Not Constitute An Unlawful Ex Post Facto Law 
1. Application Of SORA Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Provisions Of 
The State Or Federal Constitutions 
Hartwig claims application of the 2001 amendments to SORA -- making 
him ineligible for release from the Act's registration requirements -- violates the 
ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. A law runs afoul of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause if it: (1) makes an action done before the passing of 
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; 
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed 
to the crime, when committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. See State v. Byers, 
102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788, 795 (1981); see also U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 
10. Thus, the crucial determination to be made is whether SORA's provisions 
6 
~-
are "punitive." Under prevailing state and federal case law, SORA's provisions, 
including its 2001 amendments, are civil and regulatory -- not punitive. 
Therefore, their application does not violate constitutional ex post facto 
provisions. 
In Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003), the United States Supreme 
Court provided guidance in considering claims similar to Hartwig's: 
This is the first time we have considered a claim that a sex 
offender registration and notification law constitutes retroactive 
punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The 
framework for our inquiry, however, is well established. We must 
"ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 
'civil' proceedings." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 ... (1997). 
If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that 
ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a 
regulatory scheme that is civil and non punitive, we must further 
examine· whether the statutory scheme is "'so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's) intention' to deem it 
'civil.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-
249, ... (1980». Because we "ordinarily defer to the legislature's 
stated intent," Hendricks, supra, at 361 ... , '''only the clearest 
proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what 
has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," 
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 ... (1997) (quoting 
Ward, supra, at 249 .... 
In Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 98-99, 982 P.2d 931, 933-934 (1999), the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered Ray's post-conviction claim that his guilty plea 
to sex abuse of a minor under sixteen was involuntary due to trial counsel's 
failure to inform him, before his plea, that he would be required to register as a 
sex offender. Ray argued on appeal that "the sex offender requirement [was) a 
direct consequence of his guilty plea and thus, the district judge, by failing to 
notify him of the requirement, violated Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 11(c) and his 
guilty plea [was) thus invalid." & at 99, 982 P.2d at 934. The Idaho Supreme 
7 
Court disagreed -- it found the "purpose of Idaho's registration statute is not 
punitive, but remedial." kl at 100, 982 P.2d at 935. 
Although Ray did not specifically address the question of whether the sex 
offender registration act violates the ex post facto clause, the Court found 
"persuasive" the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Ward, 
123 Wash.2d 488, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994), which addressed an ex post facto 
claim similar to the claim raised by Hartwig, and considered whether 
Washington's registration requirements constituted punishment. Ray, 133 Idaho 
at 100, 982 P.2d at 935. The Washington Supreme Court stated: 
. . . the requirement to register as a sex offender under 
[Washington's sex offender registration statute] does not constitute 
punishment. The Legislature's purpose was regulatory, not 
punitive; registration does not affirmatively inhibit or restrain an 
offender's movement or activities; registration per se is not 
traditionally deemed punishment; nor does registration of sex 
offenders necessarily promote the traditional deterrent function of 
punishment. Although a registrant may be burdened by 
registration, such burdens are an incident of the underlying 
conviction and are not punitive for purposes of ex post facto 
analysis. We hold, therefore, that the [sex offender registration 
Act's] requirement for registration of sex offenders, retroactively 
applied to Ward and Doe, is not punishment. Thus, it does not 
violate ex post facto prohibitions under the federal and state 
constitutions 
Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074. Applying the rationale of Ward, the Ray decision 
similarly concluded sex offender registration "is not an additional punishment." 
133 Idaho at 101,982 P.2d at 936. The statute "provides an essential regulatory 
purpose that assists law enforcement and parents in protecting children and 
communities." kl at 101, 982 P.2d at 936. Accordingly, the Court held that "sex 
offender registration is a collateral, not direct, consequence of pleading guilty." 
8 
Id; see State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 86, 175 P.3d 764, 775 (2007) (sex offender 
registration requirement is not cruel and unusual punishment under the state 
constitution because "[t]he requirement that sexual offenders register does not 
impose punishment"). 
In finding SORA does not violate the ex post facto provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court commented in Riw, "[a]nother factor 
lessening the punitive aspect of the [sex offender registration] requirement is that 
the registrant can petition to be released from the requirements after ten years." 
133 Idaho at 101, 982 P.2d at 936; see I.C. § 18-8310(1). Relying on that 
comment, Hartwig asserts, "[i]f the ability to petition for release lessens the 
punitive effect, then the fact that SORA, as amended and applied by the State, 
precludes Mr. Hartwig from ever petitioning for release must heighten SORA's 
punitive effect." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) 
Hartwig is not, however, in the same position as was the petitioner in Ray, 
who challenged SORA's constitutionality as a sex offender who was eligible to 
petition for release after ten years. Ray, 133 Idaho at 98, 982 P.2d at 933. The 
2001 amendments to SORA did not preclude most sex offenders from petitioning 
for release from the registration requirements after ten years -- only persons 
convicted of offenses defined by SORA as "aggravated offenses" became 
ineligible for release during their Iifetime.5 Even if SORA is considered less 
5 Violent sexual predators and recidivists were previously precluded from 
petitioning for release from SORA's registration requirements in 1998 and 2000 
respectively. 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.411, § 2, p.1282; 2000 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, ch.236, § 2, p.664. 
9 
punitive in regard to those convicted of non-aggravated sex offenses because 
they can petition for release from its registration requirements after ten years, it 
does not follow that sex offenders convicted of aggravated offenses (as defined 
by SORA) -- such as Hartwig -- are "punished" because they are not eligible for 
such release. 
Four years after Ray, the United States Supreme Court similarly held 
Alaska's sex offender registration requirements are not punishment.6 In Doe I, 
538 U.S. at 92-93, the Court considered whether the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act ("ASORA"), which is similar to Idaho's SORA, violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held it 
did not. The Court first determined that "the intent of the Alaska Legislature was 
to create a civil, nonpunitive regime," because the legislature's expressed 
objective was to protect the public from sex offenders. Doe I, 538 U.S. at 93-96. 
The Court next analyzed whether "the statutory scheme is "'so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it 'civil,'" id. at 92, 
by applying the seven factors deemed a useful framework in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). Doe I, .538 U.S. at 92, 98-
106. The Court found the effects of ASORA were nonpunitive, did not impose an 
affirmative disability, and were not excessive or overly broad in light of the 
6 Although the Supreme Court determined the Alaska Sex Offender Registration 
Act did not violate the ex post facto provisions of the United States Constitution, 
upon remand, the Alaska Supreme Court found it violated similar provisions of 
the Alaska Constitution. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). 
10 
statute's stated purpose.7 J.Q, at 100-105. The Court concluded ASORA's 
provisions are "non punitive, and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause." J.Q, at 105-106. 
As part of its review of the constitutionality of Alaska's sexual offender 
registration act, the Supreme Court considered in Doe I whether a lifetime 
provision for persons convicted of an aggravated sex offense affected that act's 
constitutionality. Similar to the 2001 amendment of SORA, after Alaska's sex 
offender registration act was first enacted (in 1994), it was subsequently 
amended (in 1998) to make its registration provisions continue for life (instead of 
fifteen years) for sex offenders convicted of an "aggravated sex offense." 1998 
Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 106 (codified in Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1)). With 
regard to Alaska's lifetime registration requirement for aggravated offenses, the 
Supreme Court opined: 
The [Ninth Circuit) Court of Appeals was incorrect to 
conclude that the Act's registration obligations were retributive 
because "the length of the reporting requirement appears to be 
measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the extent of the 
risk posed." 259 F.3d, at 90. The Act,it is true, differentiates 
between individuals convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses 
and those convicted of a single non aggravated offense.[8] Alaska 
7 The Supreme Court explained that the "two remaining Mendoza-Marlinez 
factors -- whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter and 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime -- are of little weight in 
this case." Doe I, 538 U.S. at 106. 
8 Doe I, 538 U.S. at 90, further explained: 
If the offender was convicted of a single, nonaggravated sex 
crime, he must provide annual verification of the submitted 
information for 15 years. [Statutory citations omitted.) If he was 
convicted of an aggravated sex offense or of two or more sex 
11 
Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1) (2000). The broad categories, however, 
and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are 
reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is 
consistent with the regulatory objective. 
Doe I, 538 U.S. at 104. In discussing the connection between the duration of the 
reporting requirements and the danger of recidivism, the Supreme Court further 
explained: 
Our decision in [Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)], 
... is not to the contrary. The State's objective in Hendricks was 
involuntary (and potentially indefinite) confinement of 'particularly 
dangerous individuals.' 521 U.S., at 357-358,364,117 S.Ct. 2072. 
The magnitude of the restraint made individual assessment 
appropriate. The Act, by contrast, imposes the more minor 
condition of registration. In the context of the regulatory scheme 
the State can dispense with individual predictions of future 
dangerousness and allow the public to assess the risk on the basis 
of accurate, nonprivate information about the registrants' 
convictions without violating the prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
The duration of the reporting requirements is not excessive. 
Empirical research on child molesters, for instance, has shown that, 
'[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur 
within the first several years after release,' but may occur 'as late 
as 20 years following release.' National Institute of Justice, R., 
Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Child Sexual 
Molestation: Research Issues 14 (1997). 
The United States Supreme Court is not alone in recognizing the high bar 
set for finding "punishment," as demonstrated by Hendricks. Two years after 
Doe I was decided by the United States Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, in State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74,75,137 P.3d 461,462 (Ct. App. 2005), 
considered Gragg's claim that "the registration requirements of the [sexual 
offender registration] Act constitute retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex 
offenses, he must register for life and verify the information 
quarterly. 
12 
Post Facto Clause of the Idaho Constitution." After acknowledging the holdings 
of Ray and Doe I, the court of appeals first concluded, after reviewing the 
legislative "findings" provision of SORA (I.C. § 18-8302), that the Idaho 
Legislature intended SORA to establish a civil regulatory scheme -- not criminal. 
143 Idaho at 77, 137 P.3d at 464. Next, the court considered, as exemplified in 
Doe I, whether, despite such legislative intent, there was "the clearest proof ... 
to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty." kL. (quoting Doe I, 538 U.S. at 92). After 
applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors as "useful guideposts," the court of 
appeals concluded Gragg failed to show "the effects of sex offender registration 
under the Act are so punitive as to override the legislative intent to create a civil, 
regulatory scheme," and held SORA "and its effects, are not punitive and 
therefore, do not violate the ex post facto prohibition of the Idaho Constitution, 
Article 1, § 16.,,9 Gragg, 143 Idaho at 78-79,137 P.3d at 465-466. 
Four years after Gragg, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Smith v. State, 146 
Idaho 822, 203 P.3d 1221 (2009), considered the constitutionality of Idaho's 
9 Gragg also answers Hartwig's contention that SORA "on its face does subject 
offenders to an affirmative disability and restraint by requiring at-least annual in 
person registration." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The court of appeals explained: 
. Additionally, under Alaska's scheme, there is no in-person 
appearance requirement for updates to registration, Smith, 538 
U.S. at 101, 123 S.Ct. at 1151, 155 L.Ed.2d at 182, whereas under 
the Idaho Act the registrant is required to appear in person. I.C. § 
18-8307(5)(b). This is not, however, the equivalent of an 
affirmative disability to such a level as to constitute punishment. 
Gragg, 143 Idaho at 78,137 P.3d at 465. 
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violent sexual predator ("VSP") classification, in part, by comparing the 
onerousness of additional VSP reporting requirements,10 which precluded such 
offenders from petitioning for release after ten years, with the restraint deemed 
non-punitive in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), stating: 
Given the Supreme Court of the United States' determination that 
the involuntary commitment of individuals designated sexually 
violent predators is a non-punitive exercise of the state's valid 
police power, we have little difficulty in concluding that the 
imposition of additional registration requirements for offenders 
deemed VSPs in Idaho is also non-punitive. 
Smith, 146 Idaho at 839,203 P.3d at 1238. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court concluded in regard to the enhanced 
registration requirements for VSPs, this Court should also have little difficulty in 
concluding that the application in this case of SORA, as amended in 2001 to 
preclude persons convicted of aggravated offenses, does not violate the ex post 
facto provisions of the state or federal constitutions. The 2001 amendments to 
SORA are strikingly similar to Alaska's 1998 amendments of ASORA as both 
require lifetime registration of persons convicted of aggravated sex offenses. 
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court determined in Doe I that retroactive application 
of ASORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Idaho's SORA, as amended in 2001, likewise poses no ex post 
facto problem. 
10 The Smith decision noted that in contrast to the annual updating requirements 
for sex offenders, VSPs are required to update their information and photographs 
every ninety days, and have no right to petition for release from the reporting 
requirements after ten years. Smith, 146 Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. 
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In sum, under Ray, Doe I, and Gragg, the provisions of SORA, as 
amended in 2001, are not punitive, therefore application of its requirements to 
Hartwig's case does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of either the state or 
federal constitutions. 
2. Hartwig Has Asserted No Basis For Concluding The Idaho 
Constitution Provides Greater Protections 
Hartwig implicitly asserts that even if the ex post facto provisions of the 
federal constitution are not violated, the state constitution provides greater 
protections. However, as explained in Gragg, 143 Idaho at 75-76, 137 P.3d at 
462-463 (intemal citations omitted): 
Our state Supreme Court has recognized that the two constitutional 
provisions [relating to ex post facto laws] may not necessarily beaf 
the same scope or subject to exactly the same interpretation. 
In this appeal, Gragg has made no argument that our state 
constitutional ex post facto provision should be applied differently 
than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution 
nor has he cited any factor supporting such a divergence. 
Therefore, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that the two 
constitution provisions are coextensive. 
Similarly, Hartwig's appellate brief is devoid of any reason - let alone "any 
cogent reason why our state constitution should be applied differently" than the 
federal constitution. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130,982 P.2d 961, 965 
(Ct. App. 1999). Hartwig does not cite any textual or structural differences 
between the federal and state constitution, list any matters of particular state 
interest or local concem, public attitudes, or state traditions that might support an 
argument for interpreting the Idaho ex post facto clause differently than the 
federal ex post facto clause. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 
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501, 504 (1992) (Bistline, J., concurring). Therefore, this Court should view the , 
state constitution coextensive with the federal constitution for the purpose of 
considering whether application to Hartwig's case of SORA, as amended in 
2001, violates constitutional ex post facto provisions, and conclude that it does 
not. 
3. Hartwig Does Not Have Vested Rights To SORA As It Existed 
When His Case Was Dismissed 
Hartwig contends that "[w]hen the District Court ... ordered termination of 
[his] probation and that his case be dismissed with prejudice [in 1998], [he] 
acquired vested rights under the then existing laws to petition for release from 
the duty to register after ten years." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Additionally, he 
argues "[t]here is nothing in the statute or legislative history indicating a clear 
intent that the 2001 amendments be applied retroactively." (Id.) 
Hartwig has failed to provide any authorityto support his claim to having 
vested rights under SORA as it existed on the day his criminal case was 
dismissed (vis-ii-vis when he filed his petition for release from registration), or his 
apparent contention that, although SORA may be applied retroactively, its 2001 
amendments may not. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) Because Hartwig 
offers no authority in support of those two arguments, they are waived and must 
be disregarded. See State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 518, 164 P.3d 790, 798 
(2007) ("Grazian makes no citation to authority as required by Idaho Appellate 
Rule 35(a)(6) and has not preserved the issue for appellate review"); State v. 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007) (claim not preserved for 
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appellate review where "Diaz failed to present any argument or authority in his 
opening brief to support this contention"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.") 
Even if the Court considers Hartwig's claim, his assertion that he has 
vested rights in the status of SORA as of the date his case was dismissed with 
prejudice is not supported by law. As discussed previously in regard to Ray (see 
§ C-1, supra), SORA is remedial in nature; therefore, it provides Hartwig no 
vested rights. As explained in Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 
296,298 (Ct. App. 1988): 
An application is deemed retrospective if it affects substantive 
rights. City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 660 
P.2d 1355 (1983). Among the rights characterized as substantive 
are those which are "contractual or vested" in nature. Id. at 515, 
660 P.2d at 1358. Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish 
or destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be remedial 
or procedural, as opposed to substantive. Id. They may be applied 
retrospectively. 
Moreover, in State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 142 P.3d 729 (2006), the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered whether SORA continued to apply to Robinson, 
who pled guilty in 1986 to forcible sexual penetration by the use of a foreign 
object (I.C. § 18-6608), and whose plea was set aside and case dismissed in 
1996. In 2004, Robinson petitioned under I.C. § 18-8310 for release from 
SORA's registration requirements, but was precluded from doing so because the 
crime he had committed was defined by I.C. § 18-8303(1) as an aggravated 
offense. lsi 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. Similar to Hartwig's situation, the 
2001 amendments to SORA created a definition for the new "aggravated offense" 
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designation in I.C. § 18-8303(1), which included Robinson's crime -- forcible 
sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. See 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
ch.194, §1, p.659. Although there was no discussion in Robinson about whether 
the 2001 amended definition of "aggravated offense" applied to Robinson --
whose case had been dismissed in 1996 -- in explaining the issue before it, the 
Idaho Supreme Court acted as if it did, stating: 
Notably, [I.C. § 18-8310] does not permit persons convicted 
of an aggravated sexual offense to be released from the 
requirements of the registration act. In turn, the registration act 
defines I.C. § 18-6608, the crime to which Robinson pleaded guilty, 
as an aggravated offense. I.C. § 18-8303(1}. Therefore, it is clear 
that Robinson does not meet the statutory requirements set forth in 
I.C. § 18-8310 for release from the registration requirements and 
expungement. He can only be released from the registration 
requirements if the setting aside of his guilty plea and the dismissal 
of his charges under I.C. § 19-2604(1) removes him from the 
purview of I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d). 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as 
both Robinson and Hartwig had their criminal cases dismissed prior to the 2001 
amendments to SORA which defined their crimes as aggravated offenses, and 
because the Court concluded '1t is clear that Robinson does not meet the 
statutory requirements set forth in I.C. § 18-8310 for release from the registration 
requirements," it should be equally clear that Hartwig does not meet those 
requirements either.11 See Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 (determining ASORA's retroactive 
11 Contrary to Robinson's argument that the dismissal of his case removed him 
from SORA's requirements, the supreme court found, "the fact that a defendant 
later receives leniency," regardless of the "form the leniency takes, be it 
dismisSing charges or allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea or both," does not 
remove that person from the registration act. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310, 142 
P.3d at 733. 
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application did not offend the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, including 
amendment four years after enactment requiring lifetime reporting by persons 
convicted of aggravated sex offenses). See also § E, supra, and discussion re: 
Burbrink v. State, 2009 WL 3236126 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.). 
4. Application Of SORA, As Amended In 2001, Does Not Alter The 
Crime Hartwig Was Convicted Of Committing 
Hartwig asserts that "retroactive application of the 2001 and subsequent 
amendments in this case effectively convicts [him] of an offense to which he was 
never charged or convicted," in violation of I.C. § 73_101.12 (Appellant's Brief, 
p.11; see also p.21 (same).) Contrary to Hartwig's claim, the criminal offense he 
was convicted of -- lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen -- has not 
been changed by SORA's separate provisions. 
SORA's provisions are codified in Chapter 83, section 18, of the Idaho 
Code, which is entitled the "Sexual Offender Registration Notification and 
Commuriity Right-to-Know Act." In the 2001 amendments to SORA, the 
12 I.C. § 73-101 reads: "Codes not retroactive .•• No part of these compiled 
laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Bold original.) The 
amendments were never retroactively applied to Hartwig because he never had a 
vested right to petition the trial court for release from the sexual offender 
registration requirements. Ten years had not elapsed from the date he was 
placed on probation (on January 29, 1992) before SORA was amended in 2001. 
See I.C. § 18-8310(1); Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 1160 (1996) 
(holding application of amended version of I.C. § 19-4902, which reduced the 
time to file a post-conviction petition from five years to one year, was proper, and 
not retroactive); Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 
642 (2002) ("A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon 
facts antecedent to its enactment. ... Changes in procedural laws are held 
applicable to existing causes of action because the effect of such statutes is 
actually prospective in nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in 
the future."); University of Utah Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 459 
(1982) (same). 
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definition of "aggravated offense" in I.C. § 18-8303(1) was changed to include 
"lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age." Neither 
that definition, nor the classification of "aggravated offense," does anything to 
affect Hartwig's underlying crime. Hartwig has not been convicted of an 
"aggravated offense." It is only within SORA's provisions that Hartwig is deemed 
"an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated Offense," and is thereby 
ineligible to petition for release from SORA's registration requirements. See I.C. 
§ 18-8310. Hartwig's crime of conviction has not been altered. 
5. Hartwig's Reliance On Natividad-Garcia Is Misplaced 
Hartwig requests this Court to follow the reasoning expressed in United 
States v. Natividad-Garcia, 560 F.Supp.2d 561, 570 (W.D.Tex. 2008), which 
stated "this Court agrees with the reasoning of other district courts in finding that 
§ 2250 [federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act -- "SO RNA"] 
violates the ex post facto clause because it results in enhanced punishment for 
conduct that predates the time SORNA was applied to Defendant." (See 
Appellant's Brief, p.24.) 
However, Natividad-Garcia involved a special type of defendant; one 
whose non-compliance with SORNA occurred during the "gap" created between 
the effective date of SORNA and the United States Attorney General's ruling on 
SORNA's retroactive effect -- a task specifically delegated to the Attorney 
General by Congress. Natividad-Garcia, 560 F.Supp.2d at 567 ("Congress 
delegated to the Attorney General the issue of SORNA's applicability to sex 
offenders who had been convicted before the enactment of the Act, and as a 
20 
result, were unable to comply with the initial registration requirement."). As 
further explained in Natividad-Garcia: 
Defendant was convicted of a sex offense before the enactment of 
SO RNA and by inference had traveled in interstate or foreign 
commerce in 2006 when he was found in Florida after the Act was 
enacted, but before the Attomey General issued the interim rule 
applying SORNA retroactively. Since the Defendant is being 
prosecuted and if found guilty is subject to new punishments for 
actions performed before SORNA was made retroactive, a violation 
of the ex post facto clause has occurred. 
The circumstances in the instant case are similar to others 
where the courts have found there to be a "gap" situation because 
the defendants traveled after the enactment of SORNA but before 
the Attomey General made SORNA applicable to the defendants. . 
.. Therefore, the fact that Defendant is facing a possible criminal 
punishment for acts which were not illegal at the time they were 
performed by Defendant violates the ex post facto clause. 
lit at 569-570; cf. United States v. Torres, 573 S.Supp.2d 925, 946-947 
(W.D.Tex. 2008) ("Because Defendant was required to register since theday of 
SORNA's enactment (already being a registered and convicted sex offender), 
and because he allegedly violated SORNA after the Attomey Interim Rule 
became final, the Court holds that Defendant's Indictment under SORNA does 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.") 
Because of its unique facts, Natividad-Garcia has no impact on Hartwig's 
case. Natividad-Garcia's acts allegedly violating SORNA occurred during the 
"gap" of time between SORNA's effective date and when the Attomey General 
issued his ruling that SO RNA was to be retroactively applied. As the Western 
District of Texas concluded, Natividad-Garcia's actions were not illegal because 
SORNA had no retroactive application at the time of his alleged offense. 
Natividad-Garcia is simply inapposite to Hartwig's situation. 
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D. SORA, As Amended In 2001, Does Not Violate Hartwig's Due Process 
Rights 
Hartwig notes the Idaho Supreme Court determined in Smith that "the 
label of 'violent sexual predator' is a 'badge of infamy' that necessitates due 
process protections." (Appellant's Brief, p.25 (quoting Smith, 146 Idaho at 827, 
203 P.3d at 1226).) According to Hartwig, he, in effect, "is now being charged 
and deemed guilty to [sic] the offense of aggravated lewd & lascivious conduct 
without the opportunity to challenge this new charge -- without notice and the 
opportunity to be heard." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Hartwig's due process 
argument breaks down, however, upon closer examination. 
In Smith, although the Idaho Supreme Court determined that Smith was 
denied procedural due process protections prior to being classified as a VSP, its 
basis for doing so does not apply to Hartwig. The Court explained: 
While the duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by 
reason of conviction for a specified crime, classification as a VSP is 
based upon a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., 
that the offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or 
engaging in predatory sexual conduct. I.C. § 18-8314. This 
distinguishes Idaho's VSP system from a sex offender registry 
based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense. As to 
the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex 
offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural 
due process rights, noting the offender "has already had a 
procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest" the charge. Conn. 
Oep'tofPub. Safetyv. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7,123 S.Ct.1160, 1164, 
155 L.Ed.2d 98, 105 (2003); see also Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 
594 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Smith, 146 Idaho at 828,203 P.3d at 1227. 
Unlike the VSP designation that is considered a "badge of infamy" "based 
upon a factual determination of future conduct," Hartwig has not been given any 
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badge of designation. Under SORA, although Hartwig is a sex offender who has 
been convicted of an aggravated offense, I.C. § 18-8310(1), there is no 
"aggravated offender" classification. 
Hartwig's ineligibility for release from SORA's registration requirements is 
based on his conviction of a crime SORA defines as an aggravated offense only 
because of the added fact (Le., to the named offense) that his victim was under 
the age of twelve. This type of hard fact is quite different from the kind of 
subjective finding that must be made in order to classify a sex offender as a VSP 
-- whether "the offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or engaging 
in predatory sexual conduct." Smith, 146 Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. 
Moreover, although Hartwig denies having had "notice and the opportunity to be 
heard" on the subject, he "has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest" that fact. Smith, 146 Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227 
(quoting Conn, Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003)). 
First, in the state's "Motion to Reconsider and Notice of Hearing" filed 
November 10, 2008, Hartwig was provided notice that the state objected to his 
release from SORA's registration requirements because "Idaho Code § 18-
8303(1) defines and [sic] 'aggravated offense' to include Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct under Idaho Code § 18-1508 when the victim is less than twelve years 
of age," and that "[pJursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8310(1) an offender who as [sic] 
committed such an Aggravated offense is not eligible to be released from the 
requirements of registration as a sex offender." (R., pp.85-86.) Further, if there 
was any question whatsoever about the age of Hartwig's victim at the time of the 
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offense, Hartwig had a full opportunity to present such evidence at either the 
December 11, 2008 or March 13, 2009 hearings on the state's motion to 
reconsider the district court's order releasing Hartwig from the registration 
requirements of SORA. (See Tr. Vol.1, pp.54-118.) In short, Hartwig has failed 
to show that his procedural due process rights have been violated by SORA, as 
amended in 2001.13 
E. Hartwig's Rights Under The Contracts Clauses Have Not Been Violated 
Hartwig next argues that SORA violates the Contracts Clauses of both the 
state and federal constitutions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-30.) He states: 
Application of the 2001 and subsequent amendments to 
SORA in this case deprive [him] of the rights acquired through his 
contractual plea agreement and denies him of the gains that he 
reasonably expected from said agreement. It was the expectation 
of Mr. Hartwig that in return for his admission of guilty and 
successful rehabilitation that the State would abide by the terms 
that came as a direct result of his guilty plea and the laws that 
existed at that time. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.29 (emphasis added).) 
As explained in Ray, 133, Idaho at 101, 982 P.2d at 936 (emphasis 
added): 
In sum, Idaho's Sexual Offender RegiStration Act provides 
an essential regulatory purpose that assists law enforcement and 
parents in protecting children and communities. Indeed, the fact 
that registration brings notoriety to a person convicted of a sexual 
offense does prolong the stigma attached to such convictions. 
However, the fact of registration is not an additional punishment; it 
does not extend a sentence. Rather, registration provides an 
information system that assists in the protection of communities. In 
13 To the extent Hartwig's due process argument is based on his claim that the 
state has convicted him of an aggravated offense, the state relies upon its 
argument from § C-5, supra, for its response. 
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holding that sex offender registration is a collateral, not direct 
consequence of pleading guilty, we affirm the district judge's denial 
of Ray's post-conviction petition in this regard. 
Under the holding in Ray, the registration requirements under SORA are not a 
direct consequence of Hartwig's plea of guilt.14 
Instructive on the Contracts Clause issue is Burbrink v State, 2009 WL 
3236126 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.), in which the Ohio appellate court considered a 
situation similar to Hartwig's. It explained the underlying facts as follows: 
On April 29, 2005, petitioner-appellee Robert Burbrink 
pleaded guilty in a plea bargain to sexual battery in violation of R.C. 
2907.03(A)(3). Prior to accepting the plea, the trial court stated, 
"There is an agreement that he be a sexually-oriented offender." 
Defense counsel stated that he had explained to Burbrink that 
sexually oriented offender was the lowest classification. The court 
informed Burbrink about his registration requirements. The court 
then accepted the plea, found Burbrink guilty of sexual battery, 
imposed sentence, and found that Burbrink was a sexually oriented 
offender. Under former R.C. Chapter 2950, Burbrink was required 
to annually register as a sexual offender for ten years. 
In 2007, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 
("S.B. 10") to implement the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006. S.B. 10 amended various sections of R.C. 
Chapter 2950. Burbrink was notified that he had been reclassified 
under S.B. 10 as a Tier III sex offender and that he was required to 
register with the local sheriff every 90 days for life. 
jQ,at*1. 
In determining Burbrink's Contracts Clause rights (state and federal) had 
not been violated by the increased frequency and duration required by the new 
amendments to Ohio's sex offender registration law, the Ohio appellate court 
explained: 
14 To the extent Hartwig contends he has "vested rights," the state relies upon its 
argument from § C-4, supra, to supplement this response. 
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At the time he entered his plea, Burbrink had no reasonable 
expectation that his sex offense would never be made the subject 
of future sex-offender legislation and no vested right conceming his 
registration duties. "[Wlhere no vested right has been created, 'a 
later enactment will not burden or attach a new disability to a past 
transaction or consideration in the constitutional sense, unless the 
past transaction or consideration * * * created at least a reasonable 
expectation of finality. '" Sex offenders have no expectation of 
finality in the consequences of the judgments against them. The 
state could not and did not contract to bar the legislature from 
modifying sex-offender registration and notification statutes. 
Burbrink had no vested contractual right with which the legislature 
could interfere. Therefore, the retroactive application of S.B. 1 D's 
tier-classification and registration requirements does not violate the 
Contract Clause of the Ohio and United States constitutions. 
Future sex-offender registration and notification statutes are 
remedial and not punitive. They are not punishment, and they are 
not part of any sentence imposed on the sex offender. The new 
tier-classification and registration requirements are merely collateral 
consequences of the underlying criminal offense. Therefore, they 
do not affect any plea agreement previously entered between the 
state and the defendant. 
Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). 
The reasoning in Burbrink is compelling. As applied to Hartwig, "[t]he 
state could not and did not contract to bar the legislature from modifying sex-
offender registration and notification statutes. [Hartwig] had no vested 
contractual right with which the legislature could interfere." Id. Therefore, 
"retroactive application of [SORA, as amended in 2001] does not violate the 
Contract Clause of the [Idaho] and United States constitutions." lit Hartwig has 
failed to show that his rights under the Contracts Clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions have been violated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
reinstating Hartwig's requirement to register as a sexual offender. 
DATED this 28th day of December 2009. 
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